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Institutional Work and Infrastructure Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs): The Roles of Religious Symbolic Work 
and Power in Implementing PPP Projects
Abstract
Purpose- The public and project management disciplines 
increasingly adopt neo-institutional theory to analyze how 
institutional pressures affect the implementation of 
infrastructure public-private partnership (PPP) projects. In this 
paper, the micro-dynamics through which actors enact responses to 
institutional structuration in the expansion and transformation of 
an airport from a public entity into a PPP in Saudi Arabia is 
investigated.
Design/methodology/approach- A single case study design is well-
suited to the exploratory and inductive nature of the research. 
This method offers an empirically rich and thick description of 
events, such as the dynamic processes, practices, and types of 
institutional work carried out by actors and organizations to 
deliver the project under investigation.
Findings- The case analysis shows that religious symbolic work as 
social integration triggered system integration work, which 
expanded the power capabilities of individual actors leading the 
project. Repair work then followed to alleviate the negative 
effects of disempowering the agency of actors negatively affected 
by the PPP model, and to streamline the project implementation 
process.
Originality/value- The paper contributes new insights regarding 
the roles of religious symbolic work, allied with social and system 
integration of power relations in implementing PPP projects, and 
suggests a theoretical shift from fields to individuals as enablers 
of new forms of project delivery that break with the institutional 
status quo.
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Introduction
An emerging trend in the public-private partnership (PPP) 
literature adopts neo-institutional theory to analyze PPP 
projects’ implementation (Agyenim-Boateng et al., 2017; Jooste & 
Scott, 2012a). While researchers have long emphasized the 
influence of institutional environment on performance of 
infrastructure projects (Clegg, 1989, 1990; Kadefors, 1995), this 
recent emphasis points out that projects do not operate as “lonely 
islands,” but are “contextually-embedded open systems” that 
function within complex organizational and historical settings 
(Engwall, 2002, p. 790). The institutional approach thus 
encompasses the past experiences, values, and social norms that 
underpin project organizing (Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007; Kujala et 
al., 2014; Soderlund, et al., 2017). Morris and Geraldi (2011) 
have stated that a focus on the institutional level can “improve 
the performance of projects” because their technical and strategic 
features are “conditioned, constrained and supported” by their 
institutional milieu (p. 28). In this paper, PPPs are defined as 
“long-term contracts or arrangements” in which the private sector 
is “involved in the design, building, maintenance and/or operation 
of a public infrastructure,” which it co-finances (Koppenjan, 
2008, p. 1991). Furthermore, institutions are defined as 
“regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements that, 
together with associated activities and resources, provide 
stability and meaning to social life” (Scott, 2014, p. 56). They 
are the “shared rules, beliefs and practices…enacted and 
(re)produced by various actors” within various organizations 
(Tukiainen & Granqvist, 2016, p. 1835), mutually constituting 
their institutional universes.
A review of the PPP literature adopting neo-institutional 
theory reveals two central themes: 1) the impact of external 
isomorphic pressures on the choice of PPP for infrastructure 
delivery; and 2), the role of PPP-enabling organizational fields 
and structuration in facilitating PPP implementation. As such, by 
focusing on macro and meso levels of analysis, these bodies of 
literature have ignored “what happens inside the black box of 
megaprojects” (Söderlund et al., 2017, p. 9), and this leaves 
unexplored the agentic and power dynamics through which the 
interplay between individual actors and their institutional 
structures occur (Lawrence, 2008). Overcoming this gap requires 
exploring the micro-dynamics and power relations through which 
actors affect their institutional environment (Clegg, 2010). 
However, research regarding how actors use power to shape 
organizational life and projects remains scant despite its 
centrality to understanding the interactions between the work of 
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individual actors and the constraining forces of institutional 
structure (Clegg, 2010; Rye, 2015).
The paper neither overstates macro-institutional effects on 
projects nor overlooks the micro perspective. Instead, it attempts 
to strike a balance between them and argues that departing from 
the micro-level might enable us to capture actors’ actions and 
reveal their strategies as they urge other actors to support their 
ideas (Lawrence et al., 2013). To achieve its objective, this paper 
adopts the approach of institutional work defined as “the purposive 
action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, 
maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006, p. 215). Because this framework allows a micro view of the 
activities and strategies of institutional actors and portrays 
them as “reflective, goal-oriented and capable” agents, it can 
potentially uncover the tactics actors use to acquire and use power 
to affect existing forms of project organizing (Lawrence et al., 
2013, p. 1024). As such, the two central research questions of 
this study are: 1) What types of institutional work do individual 
actors perform to gain power to initiate PPPs, and 2) how do the 
resultant modes of power drive the implementation process forward?
We investigate these questions in the context of Saudi Arabia, 
which is a suitable empirical setting in which to answer this 
question because PPPs have not been the institutionalized or 
legitimate form of infrastructure delivery in the past. When the 
extension of Medina Airport was privately financed and then 
transformed from a public entity into a private one in 2012, PPPs 
entered the scene for the first time in a transportation project. 
Exploring how individual actors managed to implement such a 
divergent organizational change and navigate institutional 
structures to implement new forms of projects is the story we 
recount and analyze.
In doing so, we advance neo-institutional heory and project 
management in three significant ways. First, we expand the means 
through which institutional work affects institutionalized forms 
of project organizing. We propose that religious symbolic work, as 
a specific form of institutional work in which actors purposefully 
employ shared religious beliefs to influence the decis on-making 
of powerful actors who can enable and empower the implementation 
of new forms of project organizing. Second, we broaden the analysis 
of organizational power in projects and show how power can be a 
positive force for change when triggered by religious symbolic 
work. Finally, we stress the importance of a theoretical shift 
from fields into micro activities of individuals, and we analyze 
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the interplay between agency and structure to produce analytical 
insight into the lives and actions of agents inside projects.
The paper is organized as follows. First, a literature review 
discusses recent uses of institutional theory to explain the 
implementation of PPP projects and illustrates the lacuna of a 
micro-perspective. The institutional work approach is presented 
together with the reasons why it can provide deeper insights into 
how actors can exploit existing symbolic and power dynamics to 
affect the existing institutional structure. The case design, 
data-gathering and analysis techniques follow before the 
presentation of research findings. Finally, the paper’s 
theoretical contributions are discussed.
The impact of institutional context on PPP projects
The following section reviews the evolving and disparate body of 
research that explicitly uses the label of “institutional theory” 
to analyze which factors affect the adoption and implementation of 
PPPs. This section argues that while the public and project 
management disciplines have employed several conceptual lenses 
such as isomorphism, organizational fields and structuration to 
explain why governments choose PPPs instead of traditional forms 
of project organizing, these lines of research have not 
incorporated the micro-level analysis that can reveal the 
institutional work of actors in affecting the choice and 
implementation of projects.
Isomorphic pressures and adoption of PPP
When academic research often reports political controversies 
(Khadaroo, 2005; 2008; Flinders, 2005), technical complexities 
(Zhang, 2005) and higher risks and uncertainties muddling the 
implementation of infrastructure PPPs (Grimsey and Lewis, 2000; 
Stafford and Stapleton, 2017), not to mention their dubious claims 
of value for money and efficiency gains (Carpintero and Petersen, 
2015; Biygautane, 2017), why do governments continue to adopt PPPs?
Neo-institutionalism’s “explanation of the similarity 
(‘isomorphism’) and stability of organizational arrangements” 
offers a useful framework to answer this question (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996, p. 1023). Countries’ adoption of PPPs can be 
ascribed to the interplay among several isomorphic pressures 
operating either within or outside these countries’ institutional 
contexts, forcing these countries to imitate existent practices 
within their institutional fields to acquire and sustain their 
legitimacy (Scott, 2008). For example, Khadaroo (2005) has 
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attributed the emergence of the UK’s PFI standard-setting process 
to three factors: coercive pressures exercised by the UK’s 
Treasury, normative pressures stemming from the accounting 
profession, and mimetic forces that saw public sector 
organizations plagiarizing each other’s submissions to the 
Treasury. Similarly, Connolly et al., (2009) have found that, 
despite the certainty of government actors in Ireland that PPPs 
would not offer higher value for money as propounded by PPP 
enthusiasts, “indications from the UK government that PPP was the 
only game in town” meant that it became “the only option” for 
delivering school infrastructure (p. 10). The same study revealed 
that, while Ireland’s local government knew about the “negative 
aspects of PPPs in the UK,” they still “persisted with the PPP 
model and sought legitimacy through its adoption” (p. 12).
A recent study by Sheppard and Beck (2016) has contended that, 
while Ireland’s central government originally introduced the UK’s 
PPP model as a voluntary option to modernize its public 
administration, it is now increasingly pushing the adoption of 
PPPs for infrastructure delivery. Ireland’s public-sector 
organizations are now reported as reluctantly pursuing PPPs to 
maintain institutional legitimacy (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). 
Moreover, Jooste, Levitt, and Scott (2011) have found that mimetic 
pressures explain the diffusion of infrastructure PPPs from the UK 
into British Columbia (Canada), Victoria (Australia), and South 
Africa. Several actors from those countries traveled to the UK to 
learn from its PFI model or hired consultants with such experience 
in order to replicate the UK’s example.
Organizational fields and structuration
As a result of cancellations of several contracts for high-profile 
PPP projects (Jooste and Scott, 2012a) as well as reports of their 
failure to deliver the promised value for money (Connolly et al., 
2009), isomorphic pressures for adopting PPPs were insufficient to 
explain why governments adopt them or why PPPs ultimately fail in 
these cases.  Many PPP scholars, therefore, have responded to this 
situation of apparent failure by adopting organizational fields as 
a unit of analysis to examine how certain organizations could 
support or hinder PPP programs. Organizational fields are “in the 
aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key 
suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, 
and other organizations that produce similar services and 
products” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 148). The field 
perspective enables a shift from “an organization-centric or 
dyadic to a more systemic level of analysis,” which captures not 
only “organizations in environments but … the organization of the 
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environment” (Scott, 2008, p. 434). Fields thus serve as an 
intermediate layer between the internal dynamics of PPPs and the 
broader social context. Jooste and Scott (2012b) have stated that 
the complexity of PPP projects requires developing an 
institutional field: they nominate the capacity of public sector 
organizations, increasing PPP’s legitimacy, and balancing the 
interests of the public, private, and civic sectors as key issues 
in its establishment. Such requirements, they suggest, can be 
provided only through “PPP-enabling organizational fields,” which 
include sponsoring departments, PPP units, transaction advisors, 
regulators, advocacy associations, and development agencies 
(Jooste and Scott, 2012b, p. 22).
Several comparative studies have, consequently, begun to 
examine the significance of PPP-enabling organizations. Mahalingam 
et al., (2011) have suggested that the effectiveness of 
coordination agencies (PPP units) increases when they are involved 
in the entire project cycle, especially if they ensure the transfer 
of PPP-related expertise to government departments. Jooste and 
Scott (2012a), however, have argued that a stand-alone PPP unit is 
insufficient. Instead, when groups of public, private, and not-
for-profit entities work together, they exert a stronger impact on 
PPPs’ implementation. More recent studies confirm this claim while 
listing government strategies that effectively translated into 
increased adoption of PPPs in Ireland (Sheppard and Beck, 2016). 
Nonetheless, Verhoest et al., (2015) question the full impact of 
PPP-enabling organizations on PPP projects and found that, while 
organizational support for PPP was necessary, it was insufficient 
to account for greater uptake of PPPs.
While the organizational fields’ perspective sheds light on 
how organizations  affect projects’ implementation, this stream of 
research has been complemented by the work of PPP scholars  who 
have recently adopted the structuration perspective to provide a 
bigger picture regarding how the socio-political features and 
blueprints of their institutional contexts are carried out in PPP-
related fields (Scott and Levitt, 2017). Structuration theory 
states that social structures contain organized rules and 
resources that “are not brought into being by social actors, but 
continually recreated by them via the very means whereby they 
express themselves as actors (Agyenim-Boateng et al., 2017). In 
and through their activities, agents reproduce the conditions that 
make these activities possible” (Giddens, 1984, p. 2). As cases in 
point, Jooste, Levitt and Scott (2011) have analyzed why although 
governments in Australia, Canada and South Africa all gained 
insights from the “the UK’s Private Finance Initiative (PFI) as a 
first ‘PPP-enabling field’ and an exemplar for other countries,” 
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their PPP-enabling fields ended up evolving differently (p. 12). 
By investigating the roles of several PPP-related organizations 
within the three countries, the activities of central 
institutional entrepreneurs in structuring their organizational 
fields, and the mechanisms actors adopted to create PPP-enabling 
mechanisms, the authors confirmed structuration theory’s assertion 
that actors “bring about the formation of the field and change in 
it over time” (p. 22) in a manner that reflects prevailing 
political and social preferences.
Likewise, Mahalingam and Delhi (2012) have examined why PPP-
enabling fields evolved differently in three similar Indian states 
that experienced the same coercive pressure from their central 
government to a opt PPPs. They concluded that, when the actors 
viewed PPPs as being aligned with their own interests, they 
formulated PPP-supporting organizational fields. In contrast, 
those that saw their nterests threatened by the PPP model designed 
PPP-opposing organizational fields. The findings of this article 
direct attention toward the “agency of field actors” (p. 183) and 
reinforce the premise that organizational fields are subject to 
change or continuity based on the interests and capacities of field 
actors. Furthermore, Matos-Castaño et al., (2014) traced the 
reasons why PPPs’ requirements, such as capacity, trust, and 
legitimacy, were successfully diffused in the organizational field 
of the Netherlands but failed to materialize in India. They found 
that since PPPs fit the political and social expectations of 
policymakers in the Netherlands, those actors institutionalized 
the required mechanisms to support PPPs’ implementation. The lack 
of such interest among policymakers in India was behind the absence 
of similar supporting mechanisms and led to a decline of PPPs. 
While these studies offer valuable insights regarding how 
organizational fields affect PPPs, they overlook the types of 
institutional work that occur at a more micro-level within these 
fields.
To summarize, the role of individual actors has not been 
incorporated into the PPP debate. In contrast, the extant 
literature’s focus on isomorphic pressures, organizational fields 
and structuration limit the scope of the PPP debates to how the 
“activities and interactions of a set of organizations” determine 
PPP project implementation outcomes (van den Hurk and Verhoest, 
2015, p. 4). 
Institutional work and the micro-dynamics of individual 
agency
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In this section, we suggest that connecting existing PPP research 
-that currently adopts a meso level of analysis- with the 
institutional work perspective can potentially uncover the role of 
actors’ work in PPP projects and provide the missing micro-level 
of analysis in PPP literature. Specifically, this section borrows 
recent insights from neo-institutional theory and power literature 
to reveal the strategies and symbolic work employed by individual 
actors to access and use power to change institutionalized 
practices. 
Institutional and symbolic work
Institutional work is “the purposive action of individuals and 
organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting” 
institutional norms and rules that govern organizations (Lawrence 
and Suddaby, 2006, p. 215). It portrays individual actors as 
autonomous centers of action in institutional fields. 
Institutional work acknowledges that individual agency is neither 
the outcome of actors’ institutional embeddedness, nor is it immune 
to its influence. Instead, individual actors are endowed with the 
capacity to reflect on their institutional surrounding, “develop 
conscious intentionality,” and plan strategic actions and 
activities to “affect their social symbolic context” (Phillips and 
Lawrence, 2012, p. 223). Institutional work begins by exploring 
why (intentionality) and how (effort) actors purposefully engage 
in both the practices and processes of organizational or 
institutional change, regardless of whether or not they accomplish 
their goals. Starting from the why and how is important, since 
this can address structuration theory’s silence concerning how 
actors’ knowledge and awareness of their context develops, which 
micro-activities they adopt and how any resultant conflicts or 
tensions between individual agency and structural controlling 
mechanisms play out (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). 
Numerous studies have examined the forms of work actors engage 
in to create, maintain or disrupt institutions or 
institutionalized forms of organizing (Lawrence and Suddaby, 
2006). This type of work requires the mobilization of material as 
well as cognitive resources and efforts to establish the legitimacy 
of the proposed change (Johnson, 1990), and convince actors for 
the need of abandoning an institutionalized practice that no longer 
fits organizational life (Maitlis, 2005). One of the effective 
strategies for changing institutionalized practices is sensegiving 
(Fiss and Zajac, 2006), defined as the “process of attempting to 
influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of others 
toward a preferred redefinition of organizational reality” (Gioia 
and Chittipeddi, 1991, p. 442). Sensemaking is particularly 
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essential when actors within an organization face surprising or 
confusing situations that emanate from an abrupt change of 
organizational direction or strategy (Gioia and Thomas, 1996).
Furthermore, work related to readjustment of organizational 
identity (Bailey and Raelin, 2015; Kraatz et al., 2016) has been 
featured in organization studies literature as an important 
strategy to restructure the organizational culture of entities 
undergoing change and to fit the new realities of working with 
different logics (Ravasi, 2016). This work aims to “reduce the 
tensions internally between its organizational identity and the 
new practices associated with the new logic” (Gawer and Phillips, 
2013, p. 1057), requiring several activities and strategies, 
ranging from material and moral incentives to educating actors and 
building their capacity and readiness for change (Bailey and 
Raelin, 2015; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006).
 Institutional theorists, however, have noted that 
organizations are not merely technical systems governed by 
rational decision making, power dependencies, and actors’ 
interactions, but most importantly, organizations carry “symbolic 
aspects.” (Scott, 1987, p. 507; Dandridge et al., 1980; Turner, 
1990). Organizational symbolism refers to the “discrete acts of 
persuasion or influence,” which emanate from actors’ shared belief 
systems and which are embedded within their social and cultural 
background (Hambrick and Lovelace, 2018, p. 111). Organizational 
actors activate these symbols “to reveal or make comprehendible 
the unconscious feelings, images, and values” that are shared among 
members of an organization (Dandridge et al., 1980, p. 77), in 
order to “propel” certain actors to “engage in behaviors that align 
with the exhilaration they derive from the symbol itself” (Hambrick 
and Lovelace, 2018, p. 118; Strati, 1998).
The institutional work literature has recognized the 
significance of symbols in organizational life and begun to ascribe 
particular interest in “symbolic work that uses symbols, including 
signs, identities and language” to affect an institutional order 
(Hampel et al., 2017, p. 570). The breadth of these symbols is 
limited, however, to the use of language and narrative rhetoric 
(Zilber, 2007), identity and practice work (Gawer and Phillips, 
2013; Jones and Massa, 2013), emotion work (Watson, 2008; Barberá-
Tomás et al., 2019), aesthetic work (Warhurst and Nickson, 2007), 
or more recently how social symbolic work affects institutions 
(Lawrence and Phillips, 2019). At its essence, symbolic work 
entails using “specific framing language that fits better with 
[actors’] divergent stakeholder preferences” (Fiss and Zajac, 
2006, p. 1173), and persuading actors to support a particular 
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organizational form over current ones. Yet, scant attention has 
been paid to the role of religion in affecting organizational 
actors’ work in organization studies (Tracey et al., 2014).
Although the use of symbols has been thoroughly examined in 
organizational studies, analysis of how associating symbolic 
meanings with mega-infrastructure projects contributes to their 
successful delivery is very limited (Soderlund et al., 2017). 
Existing studies have primarily focused on how political symbols 
advance projects (Van Marrewjk, 2017). For example, Rego et al., 
(2017) argue that the timing of constructing or completing three 
necessary historical megaprojects in Brazil was driven by the 
political and symbolic importance of events such as FIFA 2014, 
which played a critical role in finishing one of those projects on 
time. Similarly, van der Westhuizen (2017) provides a compelling 
analysis of how megaprojects as political symbols can be 
successfully implemented when they are closely associated with 
mythical discourses. The first high-speed train in South Africa 
gained the needed political support because the promoters of the 
project demonstrated the hosting the World Cup in South Africa 
depended upon the construction of that project to market for 
hosting the global sporting event. Similar to organizational 
studies’ literature, projects’ religious symbolic meaning, or how 
actors use religious symbols to affect projects’ implementation, 
has not been addressed in project management literature either.
Actors’ initiatives to carry out institutional work and 
introduce organizational practices that diverge from the status 
quo encounter resistance from both the invisible pressures of 
isomorphism embedded within an institutional field, and the 
individuals and organizations directly affected by any proposal 
for changing the status quo (Clegg and Kreiner, 2013).  Hence, in 
order to fully understand how actors use symbolic work to change 
organizations, it is essential to integrate an analysis of power 
dynamics within organizations. The lens of power will help uncover 
how institutional work undermines controlling effects of 
structure, and through which types of work individual actors’ 
agency overpowers the constraining pressures of structure (Rye, 
2015). 
Institutional work and power
Institutional theory’s overemphasis on isomorphism resulted in the 
“element of power … [being] largely absent from engagement with 
DiMaggio and Powell’s work” (Clegg, 2010, p. 5). As Lawrence (2008, 
p. 175) has argued, most of the subsequent research based on 
DiMaggio and Powell’s seminal work examined how the choices of 
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actors or organizations were influenced by certain isomorphic 
forces within their institutional fields “left out an explicit 
consideration of power” that would describe how actors are obliged 
to do what they would not do otherwise (Lawrence, 2008).
The concept of power is complex and elastic, and its 
definitions vary depending on the field. In this research, the 
examination of power is narrowed down to its conceptualization 
within the organizational studies literature (Clegg, 1989; 
Lawrence et al., 2001; Lawrence et al., 2005), which defines power 
as “a relational effect, not property that can be held by someone 
or something” (Clegg and Kreiner, 2013, p. 270). Based on this 
definition, power is only explicit when it is exercised through 
relationships among actors and organizations (Clegg, 1989), 
manifested in the ways that “the behaviors, attitudes, or 
opportunities of an actor are affected by another actor, system, 
or technology” (Lawrence et al., 2012, p.105).
In the organizational analysis, power is postulated as 
operating through two modes: “episodic” and “systemic” (Lawrence 
et al., 2001; Lawrence and Robinson, 2007). Episodic power consists 
of the “relatively discrete, strategic acts of mobilization 
initiated by self-interested actors,” and represents the most 
explicit expression of the agency of specific and recognizable 
individual or organizational actors (Lawrence et al., 2001, p. 
629). Systemic power, meanwhile, operates “through the routine, 
ongoing practices of organizations” and is embedded in the cultural 
and “social systems that constitute organizations” (Lawrence and 
Robinson, 2007, p. 384). Hence, this mode of power is not 
attributed to specific individuals but is coded within overarching 
cultural and organizational systems. 
To better articulate how these two modes of power function in 
a social context, Pitkin’s (1972) concept of power over is used to 
describe systemic power, while we use power to in reference to 
episodic power, appreciating that power episodes do not 
necessarily have to be coercive or constraining, but could also be 
facilitative. Power over means power “over other people, [or] 
enforcement of one’s intentions over those of others,” while power 
to means “an ability to do or achieve something independent of 
others,” including indirectly through routine and bureaucratic 
ways (Göhler, 2009, p. 28). As such, power over constantly 
restricts the choices of those subjected to it, “disempowers” their 
capacity, and limits their fields of action (Rye, 2015). The focus 
of power to, in contrast, is not on its effect on others subjected 
to it but on its “empowerment” of other actors to act more 
autonomously and to gain a comparative advantage over other actors 
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in the field. Sometimes this is achieved in order to overpower the 
agency of others; other times it may conjoin with others to expand 
collective agency. The delicate interconnectedness between power 
over and power to means that, in order to access power over, actors 
need the capacity to exercise power to; however, exercising power 
to do something is also dependent upon having access to power over 
resources and people (Clegg and Kreiner, 2013).
How are these modes and circuits of power used and how do 
they affect actors and organizations? Lawrence et al., (2001) have 
argued that when actors use episodic power and approach their 
targets as subjects with the capacity to choose whether to do 
something (Clegg, 1989), they use influence to persuade them of 
the benefits of a certain action. Influence is carried out through 
informal networks and relies on persuasive accounts and 
negotiations that are particularly important to justify why a new 
trajectory or organizational model is essential, making this form 
of power particularly useful during the starting phases of new 
initiatives (Lawrence, 2008). However, when organizational actors 
are treated as objects (incapable of choice), force is applied 
coercively through formal organizational hierarchies to leave them 
no choice but to do something that they would not otherwise do, 
either because it does not serve either a personal or 
organizational sense of their interests (Lawrence and Robinson, 
2007). The two are often entangled, of course, one is the bearer 
of the other.
Although systemic power may be empirically invisible, 
manifest through tacit pressures on actors and organizations, it 
differentially affects actors when they are considered as either 
subjects or objects. When actors are treated as subjects, social 
power is exercised as discipline, which “shapes the identities of 
targets and…leads them to act in specific ways,” and subsequently 
and indirectly affects the choices that those actors make (Lawrence 
and Robinson, 2007, p. 389). However, when actors are treated as 
objects, systemic power is manifested as a mode of domination that 
indirectly restricts choices through informal representations of 
systemic power in the guise of culturally taken-for-granted 
practices, as well as more formal representations, such as the 
controlling effects of bureaucratic systems in which the actors 
operate (Lawrence, 2008).
Furthermore, while earlier theorizations of power considered 
power relations as having a one-dimensional coercive perspective 
whereby one actor determines the choices available for another 
actor (Dahl, 1975; Lukes, 2005), Clegg (1989) argues that power 
relations are multi-dimensional and operate through three 
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different and interconnected “circuits of power.” The first 
circuit of power is episodic, and it represents the agency or 
micro-dynamics of action which individual actors adopt to either 
constrain a certain action or to enable it, which results in 
resistance or support of affected actors (Major et al., 2018). The 
second circuit of power is dispositional which enables actors to 
reinterpret the rules within an organizational field, and it is 
exercised within a system of social integration whereby actors 
within a social system use shared meanings to justify and achieve 
their objectives (Clegg, 1989; Major et al., 2018). The third 
circuit of power is facilitative and is exercised through system 
integration which entails reshaping or changing the routines and 
rules within an organizational setting to fit actors’ interests 
and objectives.
While these forms of power are well-documented in the 
organizational analysis literature, what is unclear is the type of 
institutional work that triggers systemic power and in turn, 
legitimizes new forms of project organizing and how actors build 
upon this emerging power to implement projects. This paper 
investigates the role of episodic power to “initiate change by 
advocating key ideas and persuading actors to experiment with new 
behaviours” (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 109), while also examining 
how social and systemic power is exercised over existing regulatory 
and bureaucratic structures to empower and enable individual 
actors to carry out their work.
Methodology
Research Context
Saudi Arabia is a context in which public procurement has been the 
only institutionalized method of infrastructure service delivery 
over the past 70 years (Biygautane, 2017). The existing legal and 
regulatory frameworks have been incompatible with the requirements 
of complex PPP contracts. The Government Tenders and Procurement 
Law (GTPL) that governs tendering of infrastructure projects did 
not allow private finance for public infrastructure, or possess 
the flexibility required for designing PPP contracts (Ashurst, 
2013). Furthermore, the normative pressures for global diffusion 
of PPP projects do not exist in Saudi Arabia. High government 
revenues from oil exports have meant that financial constraints 
driving Western governments to private finance did not exist in 
Saudi Arabia, nor were the promises of higher efficiency and value 
for money important either, as the overall bureaucratic system in 
the country did not prioritize efficiency or innovation in service 
delivery (Ali, 2010). The bureaucracy was rather an accommodation 
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for local talents that might not flourish in more exposed and less 
sheltered environments. 
Particular patterns of institutionalization have flourished 
in infrastructure projects in this context. The construction 
sector in Saudi Arabia is tightly dominated and controlled by 
powerful business families with extensive networks of patronage, 
positioning them as the government’s preferred bidders for large 
contracts (House, 2013). Foreign investors and bidders are 
disadvantaged when competing for government contracts and 
corruption is endemic in the construction industry (Al-Riyadh, 
2013; Ali, 2010). As such, the lack of effective mechanisms for 
monitoring the accountability and transparency of the construction 
sector result in many cases of exploitation of public finances, 
extensive delays, and incomplete projects (Al-Riyadh, 2009). 
The case of Medina A rport
Medina Airport represents a case of divergent organizational 
change for two reasons. First, the airport had operated under the 
government’s umbrella since 1972 (IFC, 2012), and the choice of a 
build-transfer-operate (BTO) contract to expand and operate the 
airport meant disconnecting from the public sector template and 
abruptly introducing the untested market ethos. It was a shift 
that would affect not only the technical operations of the airport 
but also its identity and organizational culture by forcing a 
drastic change in how employees and management of the airport had 
worked for decades. Second, extending the airport through the BTO 
contract meant the involvement of private finance, which would 
require new legal and administrative requirements that the Saudi 
bureaucracy was unprepared to provide. 
The successful execution of this mega-infrastructure project 
in such an institutional environment promises to uncover several 
empirical and theoretical insights about how power affects 
projects. It meant that the actors leading the project’s 
implementation had to manage resistance from private actors that 
dominated the construction sector, public organizations that did 
not understand or believe in the need for PPP at the airport. 
Importantly, it would explain how the resistance of the airport 
staff was managed when they were forced to become private sector 
employees rather than bureaucrats accommodated in an organization 
indifferent to commercial pressures. 
Research design and data collection





























































Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal15
A single case study design is well-suited to the exploratory and 
inductive nature of the research (Yin, 2014). This method offers 
an empirically rich and thick description of events, such as the 
dynamic processes, practices, and types of institutional work 
carried out by actors and organizations to deliver the project 
under investigation (Lawrence et al., 2009), which would otherwise 
be difficult to observe through quantitative methods. It captures 
complex processes over time, enables researchers to identify key 
actors and investigate how events develop, allowing for an 
immediate reframing of questions as unexpected information emerges 
through interviews (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).
The data collection techniques used to answer our research 
questions were commensurate with the chosen case study design. The 
research relied on face-to-face, semi-structured interviews 
ranging from 40 to 90 minutes in length conducted with key 
interviewees who were directly involved in the project 
implementation process. We conducted purposive sampling (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985), aiming to cover a diverse type of actors occupying 
different roles as first contact interviewees. Therefore, we 
explored Saudi news articles and published government and private 
sector reports to identify the names of actors who played a central 
role in the project. We then relied on our social networks to gain 
access to these interviewees, and a snowball technique was adopted 
later on by asking our initial interviewees to recommend further 
actors who leveraged influence in project implementation (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985).
 In total, twenty-one face-to-face interviews were conducted 
by the first author in the Saudi Arabian cities of Jeddah, Medina 
and Riyadh. To ensure that many voices were included, to minimize 
retrospective bias problems and to confirm the reliability of the 
data (Yin, 2014), individuals from across different levels of the 
hierarchy and various sectors were interviewed. Among the 
interviewees were five senior government officials, including a 
previous chairman of GACA and the GACA PPP Team leader who played 
the role of a project champion. We also interviewees three senior 
representatives from the private sector including actors from 
Medina Airport. The interviewing sample also included six senior 
legal and financial consultants who were instrumental in designing 
the BTO contract shared important insights about the process of 
gaining high-level approvals to sign the project contract.  Three 
engineers who worked in the airport before and after its 
transformation to PPP were interviewed to provide insights about 
how employees reacted to change in the management of the airport. 
Additionally, a senior representative of Saudi Airlines provided 
insights regarding the impact of the airport transformation on the 
management of airlines. Finally, two senior representatives of an 
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international organization in Riyadh who were involved in the 
process of initiating and implementing the PPP project shared 
important information about the governance mechanisms that 
supported the project. The interviews were recorded (except in 
three cases where extensive notes were taken) and transcribed 
verbatim. 
The interviews were conducted between March 2016 and August 
2017, with three supplementary interviews carried out in Riyadh in 
August 2019. The semi-structured approach that was adopted during 
the interviews allowed flexibility in asking interviewees the same 
set of questions, but also asking further elaboration and follow 
up questions when new themes or insights emerged during the 
interviews. Generally, our interview questions  focused on three 
themes: 1) reasons why PPP model was used for this project; 2) 
which actors and organizations enabled the project implementation; 
and 3) the reactions of employees and management of the airport 
and how that affected the process of transforming the airport from 
a public to a private entity. These themes were developed based on 
our prior familiarity with the research context and its 
unsuitability with the PPP model, and hence our focus was to 
understand which actors played a central role in its 
implementation. 
The second source of data was archival data which was 
important to triangulate the interview findings with more 
objective analyses of the factors supporting the project (Lofland 
and Lofland, 1995). Government and consultancy reports, speeches 
by the Saudi Monarch -discourses of some importance in an 
autocracy- as well as newspaper articles, were also used. While 
the total of 41 documents covered mostly the political, legal and 
regulatory factors affecting the project, broader academic 
resources were also drawn upon, which covered the normative and 
cultural-cognitive aspects of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, we have 
read and analyzed a YouTube video where Medina Airport employees 
protested against forcing them to transfer to the private sector 
and implored the King of Saudi to help them maintain their 
government jobs, were analyzed (YouTube, 2015), as well as Arabic 
blogs where these employees shared either their fear or enthusiasm 
about the transformation of the airport into a private entity. 
These blogs were crucial given our inability to access a larger 
number of airport employees despite our attempts to do so.
Data analysis
Data analysis was conducted through four stages following a 
deductive and inductive approach congruent with common practice in 
qualitative studies (Yin, 2014). The first step in our analysis 
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was to sift through the data and read interview transcripts 
alongside secondary sources to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of how key events, activities, and project 
milestones evolved chronologically and led to the airport’s 
transformation.  We organized this information to guide our 
analysis, and then sifted through our interview data to identify 
and code motivations (intentionality) of actors who triggered and 
pursued the PPP idea and their reasons for its advocacy. At this 
stage, NVivo 11 was used to conduct systematic analysis and assess 
the empirical prevalence of emerging analytical themes.
Second, open coding was applied to the interview data (Van 
Maanen, 1979) to identify the types of institutional work to gain 
the power to expand and operate the airport on a PPP basis. 
Specifically, we sought for instances and arguments used by 
individual and organizational actors who were promoting the PPP 
model and how they justified its need and relevance for the airport 
project. We sought guidance from institutional work as well as 
power literature to identify the types and modes of power and their 
relational impact on actors. Initially, we found that 
institutional work representing instances of episodic power 
carried out by the chairman of GACA and head of the IFC office to 
influence and persuade political actors of the importance of the 
PPP model for the airport. Their arguments were coded into first-
order themes (Gioia et al., 2013), and we identified “considerable 
delays face expanding the airport through EPC”; “arguing that 
facilitating pilgrims’ journeys to visit the two Islamic holy 
mosques of Mecca and Medina is duty of Saudi Arabia towards 
Muslims” and “using PPP to increase the airport’s capacity meant 
more landing slots for airlines and higher numbers of pilgrims.” 
Third, we performed axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), 
with the team going back and forth between theory and data to 
collapse first-order concepts into broader second-order 
theoretical categories and themes. Our purpose was to transcend 
the descriptive statements from our data and establish more 
consolidated themes. For example, consistent themes emerged such 
as “project’s religious significance”, “political actors with 
religious obligation” and “religious tourism”.
Fourth, and final stage of analysis was to look for aggregate 
theoretical dimensions, guided by our readings of literature about 
symbolism and power. We used the label religious symbolism work as 
social integration to categorize the episodic power represented by 
efforts and justifications used by actors to influence and activate 
political interest in the project. Such religious symbolic work 
was the bedrock to their commitment that the PPP model was the 
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only practical solution to deliver the project successfully, and 
emphasized the religious symbolism that the project signified as 
enabling Muslims to access the holy mosques of Medina and Macca. 
This form of symbolism has not been revealed in existing project 
management nor institutional theory.
The same analytical method was used to search for instances 
of systemic power and its manifestations. However, it was important 
first to understand the bases of such power and how it was accessed 
or activated by the two actors initiating the project, as well as 
the arguments they used for each individual/organization to which 
they reached out. The research then sought out how systemic power 
led to the empowerment of the PPP project, and how this altered 
the institutionalized and routinized ways in which the Saudi 
bureaucracy administered infrastructure projects. It was found 
that systemic power had two functions. First, a Royal Order acted 
as the dispositional form of power (Clegg, 1989) that established 
the political legitimacy and urgency of delivering the project on 
a PPP basis. A Royal Order is an exceptionally strong mandate of 
social integration in Saudi society, governed as it is by an 
absolutist monarchy. Second, ministerial power freed the PPP 
project from regulatory and bureaucratic controls that might 
otherwise have blocked its implementation, while the “professional 
disciplinary power” of the PPP Team Leader streamlined and 
supported the system integration of the entire implementation 
process (Table 1). We labeled this type of institutional work 
“system integration work” which represented the systemic form of 
power. 
After identifying the types of work to access power, we then 
moved to how the resultant forms and modes of power were used to 
force the implementation of the PPP project. It was clear to us 
that the empowerment of the PPP project meant the immediate 
“disempowerment” of the agency of several individual and 
organizational actors. We found that this type of power stripped 
the project from out of the hands of local private actors, altering 
how the bureaucratic system administered projects, with a 
considerable impact on how individual actors worked at the airport. 
We labeled this type of work as “work to disempower the agency of 
resisting actors”.
We then focused our analysis on identifying the coercive 
consequences of systemic power for these actors and the type of 
work conducted by GACA and the winning consortium to alleviate the 
effects of forcing the PPP project on the institutional structure. 
We identified repair work as the form of institutional work that 
comprised several activities such as sensegiving (Gioia and 
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Chittipeddi, 1991), capacity building, identity work (Bailey and 
Raelin, 2015; Gawer and Phillips, 2013) and persuasion, which we 
derived from the broader literature of institutional work and 
emerging themes from our data. This information is synthesized in 
Table 2.  
Finally, we developed a comprehensive data structure (Figure 
1) to theorize the relationships between themes and aggregate 
dimensions, and most importantly to develop a process model (Figure 
2) that demonstrates the recursive relationships between the types 
of institutional work and different forms of power, and how they 
affect project implementation processes.
---- Figure 1 about here----
Findings
We begin by demonstrating why GACA (a typical Saudi government 
entity) decided to break away from the institutionalized form of 
project delivery and tout PPP as an effective method for expanding 
and operating its airport (intentionality for institutional work), 
rather than using the highly institutionalized and traditional 
public procurement model. Then, we present the institutional work 
(effort) that they conducted to acquire power, and how that power 
was used to drive the implementation process forward.
Prologue: Trigger and obstacles
Familiarity with market-like practices. The empirical findings 
revealed that, although GACA was a government instrumentality 
embedded in Saudi bureaucratic inertia, its top leadership 
endeavored to instill market-like practices internally. GACA’s 
newly appointed leadership had extensive experience working in the 
business sector, and aimed to apply this experience within GACA by 
improving the quality of its airports, enhancing customer services 
and satisfaction, eventually to corporatize and privatize airport 
assets. As a former chairman of GACA stated, “Saudi is a very 
difficult place to do business, but I used to say that, at GACA, 
we could do much better than other government entities.” Such 
objectives, which would seldom be considered seriously in other 
Saudi government departments, guided GACA to greater engagement 
with the private sector in delivering services through competitive 
bids. A senior official at IFC said, “I think GACA was one of the 
leaders among the government entities in Saudi in terms of 
outsourcing its activities and working with the private sector and 
that was owing to its strategy to bring the private sector to the 
aviation sector.” One private-sector consultant stated that GACA 
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had developed the internal capacity to “design and develop projects 
that were output-based with specific deliverables, rules, KPIs, 
and requirements, and asked the private sector to bid on that 
basis.”
GACA’s active engagement, trust, and learning from the 
private sector has grown through several small-scale projects. The 
first experiment in collaborating with the private sector was in 
December 2006, when GACA awarded a 20-year BTO concession contract 
worth $249 million for the modernization and operation of Hajj 
Terminal in Jeddah to a consortium led by the Saudi conglomerate 
Bin Laden Group (IFC, 2013; Fenton, 2010). One senior IFC official 
asserted, “we had so many difficulties and there was no system and 
no understanding of PPPs, but it worked out. It was not the best 
example, but it was the first experience.” A BOT contract for the 
same airport was awarded to a private consortium to develop its 
water desalination plant (IFC, 2010). In those projects, GACA 
“conducted testing of the local private sector's capacity to 
deliver such a project in the market,” as explained by the PPP 
Team Leader at GACA, and this made it realize its strengths and 
limitations. It was also a valuable learning experience through 
which IFC and GACA collaborated and studied the challenges and 
opportunities of Saudi’s institutional setting. The former 
chairman of GACA put it this way:
“In these two projects, we learned a lot about what the other side 
wanted and how the private sector performed. There were so many 
lessons we learned from the contractual setup and we went through 
many challenges that we managed to overcome and learn from.”
Technical need and lack of local expertise. The facilities of 
the Medina Airport had not been refurbished or expanded since its 
opening in 1972 (Ballantyne, 2011). When the King announced its 
transformation into an international airport in 2006 (Al-Riyadh, 
2006) the airport “was in desperate need of an overhaul to cope 
with increasing arrivals,” which exceeded 3.5 million in 2009 (a 
50% increase from the previous year), “making it the largest 
increase across all the Kingdom’s airports” (Fenton, 2010, p. 2). 
The airport is a major port of entry for the faithful making the 
Hajj. The airport management and operation could not cope with 
passenger growth, which averaged 21% annually at the time and 
predicted to reach 14 million by 2035 (Ballantyne, 2011). Although 
the airport operated year-round, as explained by a private sector 
interviewee, it experienced “the largest number of passengers for 
two months each year during the pilgrimage season, and the airport 
struggled to manage that process efficiently.” Due to constrained 
capacity, considerable international traffic had to be turned 
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away, with increasing requests from airlines to obtain landing 
permits being declined. Furthermore, lack of efficiency and good 
governance within the airport’s old management led to nepotism and 
treating airlines differently as a representative of a major 
airline stated:
“…we used to suffer from nepotism, disrespect of the principle 
customer, preference of some companies over other ones. They were 
so slow, and they did not provide good services and we complained 
all the time to airport management, but in vain.” 
Previous efforts to expand the airport using an EPC contract 
and local private actors had been unsuccessful. The Prince of 
Medina presente  a proposal to the Council of Ministers in early 
2000s to refurbish and modernize the airport (Ouadou, 2000), but, 
according to one public employee, this progressed sluggishly due 
to “the need for a contractor and operator with a proven record of 
managing and operating complex airport projects…and getting the 
budget for the project approved by several government entities.” 
In light of GACA’s experience with the private sector, such high 
sophistication in airport construction and management was nowhere 
to be found in the Saudi private sector, and this required looking 
for alternative solutions internationally.
The comfort of GACA’s leadership in working with the private 
sector, the dire technical need to expand Medina Airport encouraged 
the IFC head in Saudi Arabia to propose to GACA’s chairman the 
idea of using PPP for the airport. The head of IFC thus explained 
to the GACA team the idea behind PPP and shared successful cases 
of international airports that were constructed and being operated 
under the PPP scheme in Jordan, Turkey, India, and Europe. Such 
isomorphic and mimetic pressures from international and regional 
experiences of PPPs provided a strong ground for suggesting and 
promoting PPPs in Saudi, particularly this promising business case 
of Medina Airport.
The proposal was welcomed, and the GACA and IFC teams then 
engaged in sensemaking exercises to analyze the requirements for 
translating the PPP idea into actual practice. Several meetings 
were held between the teams to discuss the technical aspects of 
the project and form a group of advisors and experts who would 
examine the prospect of operating Medina Airport through a private 
company. Part of the sensemaking effort involved commissioning to 
the IFC the drafting of a comprehensive feasibility study, which 
analyzed the practicality of expanding and operating the airport 
on a PPP basis. The IFC’s study showed hypothetical scenarios of 
the airport’s performance under both the public and private 
sectors. The sophistication of managerial and operational methods 
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promised under the private sector’s construction and operation of 
the airport further encouraged GACA to pursue the PPP route. One 
PPP project specialist commented, saying, “We were very excited 
about the PPP idea when we saw the new technical and managerial 
me hods and techniques that our airport had not possessed before.” 
The results of the due diligence strategic report were equally 
promising. The airport was a bankable project due to the rising 
international traffic and growing demand from international 
airlines to land. The PPP Team Leader indicated that: “due 
diligence took us four to five months, and this was the part where 
we analyzed the financial, legal, and technical aspects of the PPP 
project, and we found that it was viable and visible.”
Religious symbolic work as social integration
The rigidity of he Saudi bureaucratic systems and lack of 
regulatory systems to support PPPs convinced the IFC head and GACA 
chairman that acquiring political power and support were the only 
means through which project implementation would be feasible. 
Those two actors then exercised a mode of episodic power that 
influenced and convinced the top political leadership, on an 
exceptional basis, to allow the use of a PPP model that promised 
better outcomes for the airport than the public procurement method. 
Arguing that the project’s religious significance required an 
immediate solution. A large number of high-profile projects had in 
the past been excessively delayed or unfinished in Saudi Arabia, 
with several past PPP proposals for subway systems and trains never 
materializing (Shaw-Smith, 2011). However, the airport project had 
a unique religious status for actors who were approached to support 
it. As one senior legal consultant stated, “Medina Airport isn’t 
for air transport, it’s for Hajj infrastructure.” The key message 
repeatedly emphasized by the IFC head and GACA chairman when 
resorting to their social and political networks to form a 
coalition of actors to advocate the project was the religious 
significance of the project. The airport, as a gateway to the city 
of Medina, necessitated immediate action to increase its capacity 
and enable larger numbers of Muslims to perform their pilgrimage. 
The IFC head took the initiative early on and approached the Prince 
of Medina to explain the benefits and opportunities of delivering 
the project through PPP as well the positive impact of religious 
tourism on the economy of Medina. The Prince accepted the idea, 
although no airport in Saudi had ever been financed, constructed, 
or operated by the private sector, but the religious uniqueness of 
this airport made it a religious obligation to expedite its 
expansion. An interviewee from the private sector stated that:
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“Madinah Airport represents a different business environment and 
passenger profile because it is a religious airport. It is not like 
Riyadh airport, it is not always commercial or operational, and 
its clients are primarily pilgrims and mainly during pilgrimage 
seasons.”
The proposal to expand the airport had been with the Council 
of Ministers since the early 2000s, but its budget decision had 
yet to be completed, let alone the lengthy process of searching 
for qualified companies to deliver it.1 As a member of the Saudi 
royal family with considerable political and administrative power 
and direct access to the King, the Prince’s involvement from this 
early stage was critical. He endorsed the project and informally 
reached out to other ministers and high-level bureaucrats to 
advocate it as well. The chairman of GACA easily gained the support 
of the Minister of Defense for the project, since his organization 
operated under the umbrella of the Ministry, and he was able to 
raise the topic at Ministerial meetings. The motivation behind 
these actors’ readiness to support the project stemmed essentially 
from its religious symbolism. A government sector interviewee 
stated that:
“Location of this airport in Madinah makes it very special. It is 
a place where all Muslims want to go to. All Muslims wish to 
visit Madinah before anywhere else and this airport is their gate 
to it, and by extending it we will allow more Muslims to perform 
their religious rituals.”
Reaching out to political actors with a religious obligation 
to cater to pilgrims to the two holy mosques. As a part of their 
effort to build consensus and support for the project, the chairman 
of GACA and other ministers brought the proposal to expand the 
airport on a PPP basis to meetings of the Council of Ministers and 
Supreme Economic Council, which are headed by the King. They all 
emphasized the duty of Saudi Arabia to facilitate Muslims’ 
pilgrimage, and one government official confirmed this fact by 
stating that: “Muslims save for years and years to come to Umrah 
or Hajj and being unable to host them because of the capacity of 
the airport is our responsibility.” Individuals promoting the 
airport expansion on PPP also cited the due diligence report’s 
findings that showed how expanding the airport and operating it on 
a PPP basis would increase the number of pilgrims from 3 million 
yearly in 2008, to 8 million immediately after its commercial 
1 In fact, it took 11 years for the project to be started. In October 2011, a consortium entered into a contract with the GACA to build and 
operate the Prince Muhammad Bin Abdulaziz International Airport in Al Madinah Al-  Munawarah under a 25-year concession. In 
2018 it had 8,144,790 passengers pass through and 60,665 aircraft movements (source: TAV Traffic Results)
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operation, to 18 million by 2035, and up to 40 million in the third 
phase of expansion in 2050 (Sabq, 2015). 
The connection between the religious duty of the King to 
Muslims and Medina Airport is apparent in his speech in 2006, which 
announced that, “…given the importance of Medina to the Islamic 
world and to the entire world, I announce the transformation of 
Medina Airport into an international airport” (Al-Riyadh, 2006). 
As such, the religious factor was crucial in approaching the King 
to support the delivery of the airport through non-traditional 
means. Many interviewees stated that the connection between the 
religiosity of the airport and the political support given to it 
created a firm bedrock for embracing the PPP model, and as a legal 
consultant stated: Hajj is fundamental to political legitimacy of 
the Kingdom, fundamental for its responsibility.” Another 
government official also stated that 
“…increasing number of pilgrims is a very politically sensitive 
matter, it is part of delivering the Kingdom's obligation to the 
Muslim Community and it is the responsibility of the Custodian of 
the holy mosques, that’s what we do as Saudis and that is who we 
are”
Demonstrating that religious tourism supports job creation 
and economic growth. The head of IFC presented the PPP idea to the 
Minister of Finance and articulated its financial rewards, such as 
reducing the costs of expanding and operating the airport and 
expenses of employees, albeit with considerable financial 
guarantees to be borne by the ministry. The function of the airport 
as the gateway of the Hajj to the sacred sites of Islam meant that 
a flow of income was guaranteed, with the sharp increase in 
pilgrims each year being testament to that. The Minister of Finance 
supported the project and became an essential member of the 
coalition of actors who endorsed it, emphasizing its importance at 
the Council of Ministers and Supreme Economic Council meetings. 
The economic benefits of the project were highlighted, including 
drastically increased income flow through better management of 
landing slots and revenues. The increased volume of passengers 
that would be visiting the Medina and Mecca mosques would mean a 
massive increase in the city’s economic activities and job creation 
in the tourism-related industries that formed the backbone of those 
activities. A private sector interviewee stated that “religious 
tourism is the reason that it worked in Saudi, and now the 
government is trying to increase the number of pilgrims, so there 
will be an extensive need for bigger airport infrastructure in the 
future.” A study evaluating the impact of expanding Medina Airport 
also showed that the city could potentially host one million 
visitors per month, with its revenues counting as the second-
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highest source of income for Saudi Arabia after oil revenues 
(Ouadou, 2000). This is supported by a management consultant’s 
statement that:
“…if political leadership of this country is committed to their 
religious duty to host Muslims, how can they increase people if 
they do not have enough landing slots for airplanes to take all 
these pilgrims. We needed the standing of government for such mega 
projects to feed the religious need of the country.”
System integration work
The GACA chairman and IFC head exercised episodic power to try and 
influence the thinking of key political actors and have them permit 
a foreign private company to operate the airport. This was 
something that had never been done before in Saudi Arabia. The 
outcome of gaining approval was the empowerment of the PPP project 
through several forms of power through episodic modes of power as 
well as social and system integration as illustrated in Table 1.
Exempting the PPP project from regulatory controls through 
ministerial decrees.  One key factor that facilitated access to 
the highest echelons of politics was the support of the Minister 
of Defense. The systemic power of the Ministry of Defense was 
manifest in its position as the most potent Ministry in Saudi 
Arabia, with the Minister always one of the closest members of the 
royal family elected by the King (Kamrava, 2018), a crucial element 
of social integration. Since civil airports were, at that time, 
under the Ministry, other government entities could not dispute or 
otherwise oppose the Minister’s support for the airport. The 
Minister also supported the project by writing letters to any 
government entities that required additional documents, the lack 
of which could risk complicating the implementation process. The 
personal touch of the Minister smoothed the path for the airport. 
Similarly, the Ministry of Finance’s support was a critical factor 
in the project’s success because it assured system integration by 
issuing financial guarantees in excess of US $1.5 billion and also 
assuming liability in the event that the national airline might 
default on any of its payments, ensuring the project’s bankability 
and making it attractive to the private sector. 
---- Table 1 about here----
The Council of Ministers and the Supreme Economic Council 
were two powerful entities that represented the tight nexus of 
social and system integration in the Kingdom. The concentration of 
episodic power capabilities vested there empowered the actors 
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implementing the project. These councils comprised all of Saudi 
Arabia’s Ministers and are chaired by the King. They are the 
obligatory passage point for decision-making. They issued decrees 
requiring all government entities to collaborate with GAC. 
Besides, they issued all the necessary documents to finance the 
project through a private consortium.  Finally, they transferred 
the airport to the private operator when construction was 
completed. As one senior bank representative explained, the 
decrees ordering implementation of the project was “an exceptional 
case because it was a non-government contract”. As such, it by-
passed all the routinized ways of writing construction contracts 
and delivering infrastructure projects. Such non-compliance with 
customary Saudi bureaucracy would have been impossible without the 
support of the system and social integration condensed in these 
important obligatory passage points. 
The empowering of the project through two ministerial 
councils resulted in the creation of a high-level Steering 
Committee chaired by the chairman of GACA and composed of eminent 
figures in the political and business sectors. Again, there was a 
fusion of system and social integration legitimating the Steering 
Committee because of the prestigious figures which it contained. 
The committee was created and empowered exclusively to make any 
and all decisions critical to the project’s implementation. The 
committee held weekly meetings where project-related documents 
were signed, and letters of support provided to eliminate any 
bureaucratic or regulatory bottlenecks. The work of the committee 
was also backed up by the Prince of Medina, who issued orders to 
facilitate any project-related administrative procedures at the 
Medina governorate. He also ordered all relevant entities to 
expedite the issuance of licenses or permits related to water, 
electricity, and other services supplied by the Medina 
municipality. Royal writ is the highest form of legitimacy any 
project could achieve. The Royal imprimatur assured the smooth 
passage of the project through the byzantine bureaucracies of the 
state.   
Establishing the urgency and political legitimacy of the 
project through a Royal Order. The ultimate representation of 
social integration and dispositional power, in this case, was the 
issuance of a Royal Order. The Royal Order epitomized the political 
support enjoyed by the project as a high-level national priority 
that needed to be delivered urgently and legitimized the PPP form 
for its delivery. With a Royal Order, none would dare to be seen 
to impede the project. Although not directed to a specific 
organization or individual, the powers embedded in the Royal Order 
were implicit. Should there be cases of resistance against the 
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project, the issuance of the order would achieve consent. The 
drastic changes necessarily affecting all usual ways of operating 
national airports and developing infrastructure that the project 
entailed would not be resisted. Any necessary change in the 
behavior of individuals and organizations affected by the project 
came from the highest source of legitimacy in the land and 
irrespective of how members of organizations might think about 
what acting in accord with the order entailed, no individual actor 
could be blamed for the actions they took. They were enacting the 
Sovereign’s will.  One senior government official explained that, 
“when a Royal Order is issued, nobody has the choice to resist or 
challenge it.” The power of the Royal Order removed any regulatory 
or bureaucratic barriers even before they arose, a fact emphasized 
by all interviewees. A representative of an international 
organization stated that when dealing with the government 
bureaucracy,
“The project did not face any critical obstructions because it had 
received a Royal Order early on… so we had the top-level kind of 
green light, and all government entities were aware that the 
project was a priority and had to go ahead.” 
 Empowering the project champion to streamline the PPP 
project implementation process. Several interviewees stated that 
their preparatory institutional work was focused on creating 
coherent internal organizational dynamics to streamline operations 
and decentralize decision-making. An IFC representative described 
the PPP Team Leader, who was also leading the internal PPP unit in 
charge of the project's administrative duties, as “the oil in the 
gears making sure that things were happening and pushing government 
stakeholders to get things done.”
The practical implications of the political and royal support 
for the project were visibly manifested in the empowerment of the 
Team Leader, who acquired the power to make all critical decisions 
and navigate all government agencies to gain the necessary 
approvals. He stated that, “PPP projects need one individual who 
has the power and guts to implement all projects and make good 
decisions.” With the Royal Order as a backstop, this was not too 
difficult to achieve. Although most Saudi bureaucratic 
organizations are characterized by rigid hierarchical processes, 
GACA’s chairman transferred a considerable capacity for making 
autonomous decisions to the PPP Team Leader and delegated many 
responsibilities to other senior members of the team to accelerate 
the decision-making process. These were innovations that severely 
challenged the business as usual of Saudi bureaucracy; without the 
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social integrational elements of the project, the project would 
have likely failed. 
Work to disempower agency of resisting actors 
The political empowerment of the PPP project, by enacting systemic 
power over the institutionalized form of project delivery, 
destabilized the status quo. It entailed a new project financing 
model, rigid project governance mechanisms that had hitherto not 
existed in the construction domain, a new procurement method as 
well as a drastic shift in status for government employees within 
the airport who were suddenly obliged be subordinate to a private 
employer. The effects of enforcing the PPP method on individual 
and organizational actors are summarized in Table 2 below, which 
also illustrates the repair work necessary to alleviate those 
effects.
Opening the local market to foreign competitors as a 
disadvantage to local companies. The monopoly of a few powerful 
Saudi business families over the construction industry had in the 
past institutionalized aa regime in which they were able to 
exercise dominance in the delivery of large infrastructure 
government contracts (House, 2013; Ali, 2010).  The introduction 
of a PPP model with private financing and strict due diligence 
mechanisms exercised by international banks and investors meant 
that the processes of project procurement would be drastically 
different. Given the sophisticated technical requirements of 
airport expansion and the high complexity of its operation and 
management of the tremendous number of pilgrims visiting Medina, 
it was evident that local private actors would be immediately 
disqualified and lose ground to more advanced international 
companies. They could not rely on the traditional channels of 
patronage to deliver the contracts, and an interviewee 
representing an international organization stated:
“In Medina, several local merchant families tried to push us so 
hard to give them project contract, and many of them were very 
powerful, but we managed it, and everyone understood that the 
qualified consortium would win. This is one of the biggest 
challenges we faced with PPPs. I see it the biggest hindrance.”
Forcing the bureaucracy to administer the PPP leading to 
frustration and lack of capacity. The royal and administrative 
decrees to expand the airport and operate it through the private 
sector challenged standardized bureaucratic and administrative 
procedures. The most difficult challenge was shifting the 
bureaucratic mentality of delivering government projects through 
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the traditional EPC method. The bureaucrats in control could 
dictate contracts and set specific deliverables.  The consortia 
led by a private operator, flipped this assumption and set new 
rules of the game. There were no policies, procedures, templates, 
laws, regulations, or guidelines that government departments and 
line ministries could rely on to respond to the requirements of 
GACA and its teams’ formalization of the documentation for the BTO 
agreement, while the political backing that the project enjoyed 
meant that these government entities could not reject the project 
or challenge its implementation. GACA had social and system 
integration wrapped up and under these conditions seemed able to 
configure all the circuits of power accordingly. It had, in terms 
of direction from above and managing upwards, achieved both system 
and social integration. Managing down was another matter.
---- Table 2 about here----
Operating the project via a private entity causing fear, 
confusion, and resistance among employees. While it can be said 
that the institutional context of Saudi Arabia was the major 
problematic issue prior to signing the PPP contract, one senior 
government official explained that, after signing, it was the 
airport’s management and staff who became the “biggest challenge 
the project faced, since they refused to transfer to a private 
operator.” The transfer of the airport into the hands of a private 
operator had a dramatic impact on the management and employees of 
the airport.  It meant a shift from being a public employer to one 
that was private. There was no evidence in the data to suggest 
that the employees and staff of the airport were a part of the 
change process from the outset, or that they had been consulted or 
properly prepared for it prior to the contract signing. The change 
caused not only temporary loss of status but also a permanent shift 
in their organizational identity and radical alteration of how 
they performed their daily tasks. Different and increased 
expectations of performance prevailed, and new uncertainties 
arose.
Employees felt that terminating their contracts and 
employment as public sector workers threatened their job security. 
Although public sector jobs paid much less, what was crucial for 
the airport’s management and the staff was lifelong job security, 
longer holidays and familiarity with the relaxed government 
system. Their posts were, in effect, sinecures.  In contrast, 
private-sector jobs were more demanding and performance-based, and 
renewal of contracts every three years was predicated on meeting 
specific KPIs and competitive criteria. Furthermore, drastic 
changes would also be implemented in the form of rigid requirements 
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concerning attendance and promotion, with new technical equipment 
being introduced to operate the airport. All of these changes 
required considerable skills that many employees did not have, 
which some of them were not prepared to invest time and effort to 
learn. The need for the changes was also unclear to many airport 
employees who demanded that they remain under the umbrella of GACA 
as government employees while working for the operator. Almost all 
interviewees stressed that the refusal of the airport’s employees 
to transfer to the private operator was the “biggest challenge” 
the project faced, one that took considerable time. The PPP Team 
Leader stated that:
“…main challenges we faced after signing the agreement were with 
employees because they were used to working with the public sector 
and they felt secure, and protected, and no one could fire them 
regardless of performance. But with the private sector they must 
be on time, and attendance and performance are evaluated all the 
time.”
Employees complained that the implementation of the project 
took two years, while they were given only one week to decide which 
option they would choose (Al-Sharq, 2012b). They did not find the 
private sector offers attractive and refused those options, and 
expressed their resistance by writing letters expressing their 
contempt of joining the private operator to the King and human 
rights organizations and asking to keep their government contracts 
and benefits (Al-Sharq, 2012a). Employees also lodged a legal case 
against GACA at the administrative tribunal complaining about the 
illegality of forcing them to transfer and terminate their 
government contracts, but after five months, the employees lost 
their legal case (World of Money, 2012). They were consequently 
forced to choose among four options: 1) transfer to the operator 
under a new contract and be subject to private employment law; 2) 
be seconded to the airport for three years and then begin a new 
contract with the private operator; 3) look for a new job and 
transfer to any other airport in the Kingdom or 4), seek a new job 
with other government entities (Al-Sharq, 2012b). In absolutism, 
bureaucracy in Saudi Arabia is really perceived as patrimonial and 
employees’ resistance, based on dispositions enculturated in the 
past pattern of indulgence that their sinecures had enjoyed, 
stalled the project and caused delays in the commercial operation 
of the airport. Nonetheless, employees were given four options 
that did not alleviate their fears of abrupt organizational change 
taking place at the airport. 
Repair work
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Disempowerment of public, private, and administrative actors 
required repair work to alleviate the negative effects caused by 
the abrupt pressures of system integration work on them. In spite 
of their resistance, employees’ choices were restricted, and they 
were obliged to transfer to the private operator. There were 
pecuniary advantages, but the expectations of the implicit effort 
bargain were radically different.
Establishing good project governance and transparency 
mechanisms. The involvement of IFC in the project offered a robust 
project-governance mechanism. Existing anti-corruption 
arrangements and institutions had yet to win the trust of 
international investors well-versed in Saudi corrupt and 
patrimonial practices (Ali, 2010). According to one senior 
representative of an international organization, during the 
tendering process for the airport project, some local construction 
giants attempted “to push the envelope very hard because they 
wanted the project badly,” but were unsuccessful. The envelopes 
being pushed were unlikely to have been purely metaphorical.
With the backing of its social and system integration GACA 
was enabled to empower IFC, build strong project governance 
principles, increase the project tendering process’s transparency 
and ensure that only a bidder that met all of the technical 
requirements and that had an attractive financial proposal would 
win the project contract. GACA outflanked local construction 
companies accustomed to exercising power to win projects one way 
or another, not always in transparent, ethical or scrupulous ways 
(House, 2013). The capacity to select a competent entity led to 
the choice of a private sector actor with extensive experience in 
constructing and operating airports. 
Maintaining dialogue, sensegiving, and developing a 
partnership. GACA’s team worked to engage in effective 
communication and dialogue with private partners. At this stage, 
the number of actors increased significantly. The project’s field 
included GACA’s team, the IFC’s team, representatives of local and 
international banks, insurance companies, prequalified bidders, 
plus a complex arrangement of technical, legal and financial 
consultants. A sense of partnership and dialogue was cr tical, as 
was transparency in presenting all data related to the financial, 
legal and technical components of the project. Hiring experienced 
international consultants overcame the lack of local expertise in 
administering PPP contracts. Something identified as a critical 
success factor by several interviewees. The role of the consultants 
was essential not only due to the absence of customary legal, 
financial and technical mechanisms for such projects but also 
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because they translated international best practices in designing 
PPP contracts for airports into Saudi Arabia. International 
investors were comfortable with international arrangements that 
were customized to fit the local culture and environment.
The legal consultants drafted standard contracts that were 
used in airports internationally and put into place a general 
framework to guide the BTO agreement, which served as the primary 
governing mechanism for the partnership. The contract would be the 
critical foundation of the partnership for 25 years, so it needed 
to be comprehensive and to satisfy both parties. A clear BTO 
contract was designed by the consultants in conformance with 
international standards and included clauses for issues such as 
international arbitration, which Saudi Arabia did not have the 
institutional capacity to arrange. The private sector was 
permitted the flexibility to design the operational and managerial 
procedures and models with few restrictions to allow it to create 
innovative and efficient solutions. The involvement of a private 
partner that financed, constructed, managed, and operated a public 
entity as politically sensitive as an airport was not only 
unprecedented and contradictory to all existing laws and 
regulations but also risked loss of government control over that 
particular asset. Furthermore, the entire institutional ecosystem 
in Saudi Arabia was unaccustomed to having the private sector 
dictate rules of engagement. Typically, the public sector, the 
traditional purchaser of services, would set the rules and 
expectations to be met by the service providers.
The former chairman of GACA stated that their key strategy 
was “to keep all of the ministries and government entities that 
were influential in the project informed of everything that [they] 
did.” GACA did not base its strength on just on the official 
decrees that empowered it but also founded it on proper 
communications with all government stakeholders, explain to them 
the importance and utility of the project. More importantly, they 
showed that the exceptions granted to deliver the project would 
not affect the overall institutional arrangements of the country. 
Such sensegiving mechanism demonstrated the importance and 
uniqueness of the project to all public entities. The method proved 
fruitful. The decentralization of decision-making allowed the 
“project champion” to directly meet with government officials, 
sign necessary documents and enforce decisions. The project 
champion also filled in cracks in the bureaucratic system and 
ensured that things were moving smoothly for the project by making 
direct visits to government entities. He did not rely merely on 
correspondence, which would have slowed down the speed of the 
project but worked socially. The private partners played an 
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instrumental role in this process as well. Although GACA’s team 
was on the front lines during negotiations with government 
entities, the private consortium was also equally flexible and 
supportive when they faced deadlocks.
Readjusting organizational identity, persuasion, capacity 
building, and laying off redundant employees.  The airport 
employees and staff did not have any other choice but to transfer 
to the private operator despite their resistance and 
dissatisfaction. They were subject to an unassailable episodic 
power. Despite the coercion mobilizing the employees’ transfer, 
the actual process of implementing the change was more benign. The 
former head of GACA’s PPP unit said that they “did not engage in 
conflict with the employees” but instead motivated them to accept 
the change in the operation of the airport by a private actor by 
emphasizing its benefits, particularly stressing that it would 
enable more Muslims to perform pilgrimages. A government employee 
stated that “we kept telling employees that their work and support 
for the project would be rewarded in the hereafter as they would 
be supporting Muslims to perform their religious obligation, and 
a lot of them resonated with this idea.” To corroborate this point, 
during a regular visit to the Medina Airport during the pilgrimage 
season, the Prince of Medina was cited as saying to immigration 
officers: “you are gaining considerable reward from God by serving 
pilgrims in a good manner” (News24, 2018). The religious symbolism 
was not only persuasive and accorded with the vocabularies of 
motive of pious Muslims but also offered the comfort that they 
were working not just for the airport but for the praise of Allah.
A special committee was formed to listen and respond to 
employees’ concerns, compensating those that wished to leave the 
organization and preparing those that had decided to stay for their 
new roles. The key factor ending the employees’ resistance and 
facilitating their transfer to the private operator was that they 
would only transfer on a secondment basis for three years as 
government employees. During this period, they would either adjust 
to the new work environment or have ample time to find new jobs at 
other government entities. Workers would remain government 
employees with all of the accompanying benefits and job security, 
but at the end of the three years period they would need to decide 
whether to sign a new contract as private employees or resign. In 
addition to boosting morale, monetary incentives were also 
offered. Employee salaries were increased by 20%, housing 
allowances, health insurance and other benefits that had not 
existed within the old system were offered. Education and training 
of employees in the new organizational structures and practices 
were essential for their integration into the changing 
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organizational identity and culture. One private-sector 
interviewee noted that “a total of 630 training days were offered 
both on-site in Medina and in Istanbul” where TAV, the consortia, 
had its headquarters. These training programs, aimed at both the 
technical and psychological readiness of employees, were aimed 
effectively to enhance preparation for the new roles and 
responsibilities.
After initiating a program for building employees’ skills and 
motivation to accept change, the institutional work of GACA and 
its partners shifted toward the progressive introduction of new 
structures and systems that would prepare the airport for a new 
managerial style. Key structural changes included the introduction 
of both mechanical tools and human resource management techniques. 
The establishment of new operational and organizational structures 
meant the birth of a new airport with new international standards 
and notably higher performance. The change was drastic, affecting 
everything about the way the airport had been run under the old 
administration, ranging from the quality of ground and passenger 
services to the equipment adopted to maintain and service aircraft. 
The introduction of these new techniques was gradual, with on-site 
training being offered to ensure that the same employees could 
operate new systems.
New human resource practices were introduced, as well as 
strict KPIs that employees needed to achieve. To guarantee the 
efficiency of the workforce, private-sector’s business acumen and 
dynamism were injected into the airport’s management style 
resulting in a novel break from the past. New practices were 
introduced regarding attendance, promotion and contract renewal, 
which were now determined by performance and output. These 
mechanisms enforced the private sector practices of conforming to 
rigid achievement criteria and reaching specific outcomes and 
targets.
Nonetheless, not all employees were prep red to embrace 
change nor invest the effort to support the Muslim community’s 
pursuit of pilgrimage. Only 53% of employees transferred to the 
private company operating the airport when the 3 years secondment 
ended in 2015 (Sabaq, 2015). The remaining employees either 
transferred to other airports or took another government job or 
remained under the umbrella of GACA and worked for another 
government entity (Sabaq, 2015). Furthermore, the private operator 
of the airport laid off 200 employees in May 2017, and provided a 
few of them the chance of renewing their contracts provided that 
they agreed on lower salaries and benefits (Al-Madinah, 2017). The 
government did not intervene in the dismissal of the employees as 
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the BTO agreement specified that the private sector could recruit 
and maintain only well-performing individuals, and only on this 
basis could the private operator maintain a positive return on 
investment in the long run by hiring more efficient employees.
Discussion and conclusions
The two central research questions guiding this study aimed to 
examine the types of institutional work that individual actors 
performed to gain the power to initiate new forms of project 
delivery and how the resultant modes of power were employed to 
relax the controlling mechanisms of past institutional structures. 
By connecting the PPP literature with recent developments in neo-
institutional theory, this research makes the following three 
contributions.
The first contribution is that it broadens the scope of the 
means through which individual actors aim to “achieve particular 
institutional objectives” (Hampel et al., 2017, p. 570). It is 
evident from the list of 15 types of institutional work developed 
by Phillips and Lawrence (2012) that scant attention has been paid 
to how religious beliefs shape or fuel the institutional work 
carried out to change organizations or institutions (See also 
Tracey et al., 2014). Such lack of attention to the role of 
religion in shaping institutions is surprising, as religion plays 
a key role in institutional ordering at the societal level in the 
majority of societies, particularly those that adhere to Islamic 
doctrines. In an absolutist and Wahabi state such as Saudi Arabia, 
there is no greater political support than the duty to Allah and 
to the Sovereign. The paper extends the institutional work debate 
by proposing religious symbolic work, which denotes how actors 
purposefully employ shared religious beliefs to influence the 
decision-making of powerful actors who can enable and empower the 
implementation of new forms of project organizing.
As the case analysis reveals, the fundamental mechanism that 
the actors proposing the PPP model used to instigate interest in 
the project was by emphasizing its religiosity. The work to 
convince high-ranking officials to support the project was 
welcomed because there was a socially and culturally embedded 
common understanding among all actors that they were supporting a 
religious cause, rather than a standard construction project. In 
order to gain access to political power and overcome the structural 
barriers blocking the PPP model, actors touting the PPP model 
devised strategies by which they associated their work with several 
religious symbols. Unlike several infrastructure projects in the 
country which were initially proposed as PPPs but never received 
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the necessary high-level political backing, emphasizing the 
project’s religious significance made it an exception and 
convinced all political actors involved in the decision-making 
that the PPP was the right method. Bathed in the ethos of this 
religious motive for social integration, the project was approved 
in the ministerial council meetings and then received a Royal Order 
which portrayed the project as a national high-priority. 
The interplay and tight connection of social and system 
integration through the symbolic capital of religious and 
royal/political interconnectedness are not documented in 
organizational studies in the western context.  The demarcation 
between church and state and the boundaries between politics and 
administration are, in most cases, well-established in these 
countries. The Muslim world is different, a difference that has a 
significant effect on managing and organization, as this study 
demonstrates, even when the forms of organization that are being 
implemented have developed in a western context, as did PPP. In 
the absence of clearly defined institutional fields of church, 
state, business and civil society, it is necessary to broaden the 
conceptualization of the power of systemic integration. It is 
important to shift theorization of power from organizations into 
broader environments in which heads of state and political actors 
play significant roles, and all are underpinned as manifestations 
of power by religious beliefs that make social integration cohere 
quite overtly, as the case in Saudi Arabia.
In a similar vein, this paper offers new insights into project 
management research. The findings of this paper advance such 
research by revealing that religious symbolic work can be a 
powerful mechanism to drive megaprojects. The appealing factors in 
the project were not just its economic value and potential to 
create new jobs and expand the tourism industry of the city but 
also its role as an enabler that would allow millions of extra 
pilgrims to fulfill their religious obligations each year. The 
political elite’s intimate involvement in the project reflects the 
intricate links between religious beliefs and how they affect the 
cognitive realities of political actors, encouraging them to 
support project forms that did not fit existing institutional 
structures. The political actors supporting this project, such as 
the King, fulfilled not only their obligation to facilitate the 
journey of Muslims to the holy mosques, but also sponsored 
spiritual gratification and enjoyment. 
Second, by analyzing how circuits of power facilitated the 
PPP project implementation process, the research expands the 
discussion regarding the bases and the inter-dependence among 
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several forms of power in organizational theory and project 
management. The discussion of power in organizational studies is 
predominantly concerned with how actors use power to shape the 
formulation of strategy. It is limited to how management exercises 
the power to implement new strategic objectives (McCabe, 2009), 
how power circulates through discourse to shape the creation of 
new strategies (Hardy and Thomas, 2014), and the roles of episodic 
and systemic powers in radical organizational change (Lawrence et 
al., 2012). The power dynamics presented in this literature usually 
involve actors’ private organizations embedded within market 
logics, revealing tactics used by actors in the upper levels of 
hierarchies to exercise episodic power and change certain aspects 
of the organizations.
However, despite the crucial role of power relations in 
megaprojects, Clegg and Kreiner (2013) have noted that power 
remains a rare subject in project management research. When power 
is discussed in this field, it is often depicted as a “dirty word” 
(Clegg et al., 2017, p. 7), or a negative force that obstructs 
projects. This paper is situated among the few studies that discuss 
how power dynamics shape projects and demonstrate innovative ways 
in which power can be a positive force that drives the project 
implementation process forward. The findings are similar to those 
of Walker and Newcome (2000), who found that several individual 
actors built on their organizational power to successfully drive 
the development of the Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology. They emphasized the power of external and internal 
coalitions such as the Jockey Club and the Planning Committee that 
collectively exercised organizational power to in order to push 
the project forward while the role of the government was passive. 
Similarly, Liu et al., (2003) have argued that power in projects 
is represented in both interpersonal and organizational structural 
forms, and this is in line with our findings as well.
We developed a process model that depicts how the episodic 
and systemic forms of power operated in a manner illustrating the 
effects of each mode of power. As demonstrated in Figure 2, the 
religiosity of Medina and airport project was emphasized to build 
and develop actors’ sources of power. Because these actors were 
attempting to convince elite political actors to legitimize the 
PPP model, their exercise of episodic power sought successfully to 
activate political interest and support for the PPP, manifested in 
two forms. The first was the empowerment of the PPP project through 
several ministerial decrees and a Royal Order that forced the 
implementation of the project, regardless of its severe 
repercussions on several organizational and individual actors, 
including private actors, the bureaucracy and the airport 
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employees. It was not a process that had institutional legitimacy 
in the Saudi context, but religiosity seemed to overpower any other 
social considerations. 
---- Figure 2 about here----
By extending the empirical context to an absolutist state in 
which political power is top-down, this study addressed the call 
for research to demonstrate how power shapes organizational change 
(Lawrence et al., 2001; Lawrence, 2008). The use of social 
integration was critical in this case, since none of the actors 
affected would have voluntarily accepted the private sector logic, 
nor supported the institutional work required to implement the 
project in a non-traditional manner. The force of the religious 
ethic behind social integration disempowered resistant agency 
associated with the project, restricted their options, obliging 
acceptance of a new organizational reality that people were 
unaccustomed to.  The project had unlimited authority and 
capacities bestowed on it by the congruence of social and system 
integration, despite being radical and creative destruction of 
conventional ways of doing things in the Saudi bureaucracy, the 
destruction that led to the necessity for repair work. Systemic 
power is typically seen as embedded within social, cultural, 
bureaucratic and technological forms (Clegg, 1989; Lawrence et 
al., 2001). In this research, systemic power is premised not only 
on the system integration, but also the social integration 
encompassing the symbolic interconnectedness of religious with 
royal, political and administrative bases. In this empirical 
context, the motivation to achieve religious gratification by 
supporting Muslims in their pilgrimage is due to the impact of 
religion as a power for social integration that is invisible in 
its causal workings but deeply affects decision-making processes.
Third and finally, by extending Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) 
typology of institutional work to a PPP project located in an 
adverse institutional environment, this article m de an analytical 
shift from the macro and meso levels to the micro-level. Doing so 
allowed the research to capture the invisible efforts of individual 
actors which are currently overlooked in the PPP and project 
management disciplines, as well as how a stable equilibrium between 
agency and structure was achieved. While previous research has 
adopted a top-down approach and shown that PPP-enabling 
organizational fields are critical drivers of PPP implementation 
(Jooste and Scott, 2012b; Verhoest et al., 2015; van den Hurk and 
Verhoest, 2015; Mahalingam and Delhi, 2012; Matos-Castaño et al., 
2014), this research adopted a bottom-up approach that uncovered 
institutional workers’ strategic use of power to create a 
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triumphant story of drastic organizational change. Undermining the 
forces of structure required the “knowledgeable, creative and 
practical work” of actors who disrupted the operational model of 
public organization by acquiring and utilizing several forms of 
power (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006, p. 219). In the present case 
study, we showed that the actors leading this change effort 
understood the influence of political and religious powers and how 
to mobilize the social integrational power of religious symbolism 
to force a change that was radical for its context.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Data structure
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Table 1: Forms of power and their impact on implementation of PPP project.
Forms of power Modes in which 
power operated                                                                          
Effects of power on routinized ways of 
project delivery
King’s order System and 
social 
integration
-Provided political legitimacy and urgency of 
delivering project through PPP.
-Enforced responsiveness and adherence of all 
concerned actors and organizations in project 
implementation.




Exempted PPP project from regulatory controls 
of GPTL and allowed use of BTO agreement 
instead.




Removed bureaucratic and administrative 
barriers blocking PPP project by issuing 
decree that required all concerned entities 
to issue exceptions to normalized ways of 
working.
Financial guarantees 




Made project bankable and increased trust of 
lenders and investors in project.





Represented royal influence and power of 







Issued orders to facilitate administrative 
work required for project implementation.





-Oversaw day-to-day requirements of project 
by holding weekly meetings and fully 
supporting work of project champion.
-Removed regulatory and bureaucratic 
obstacles facing project by issuing 
exceptions to them.
GACA’s president Episodic -Streamlined internal decision-making 
processes.
-Endorsed private sector’s requests to 
government entities.
Professional power of 
project champion
Episodic -Decentralized bureaucratic pressures, with 
power to act autonomously meaning effective 
and instant decision-making processes.
-Led entire project implementation process.
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Table 2: Effects of system integration and repair work on individual and organizational actors
Impact of system integration on 
actors and organizations
New PPP project requirements which 
changed routine ways of operating
Repair work to alleviate impact of system 
integration and implement project
Local private 
sector actors
-Local private construction companies 
lost project to international firm.
-Local private actors’ capacity to 
influence project award decision was 
eliminated.
-Operation of project was handed over 
to international firm.
-It was stipulated that project would 
be awarded only to actors with 
technical capacity to administer 
projects’ requirements. 
- Sophisticated expertise in 
constructing and operating 
complex airport projects.
- High levels of efficiency in 
operating airport over 25-year 
period.
- High levels of transparency in 
bidding for project.
Establishing good project governance 
mechanisms:
-Involving IFC during all stages of tendering, 
bidding, and awarding project, which provided 
strong governance and transparency-related 
mechanisms.
-Selecting only private actors with proven 






-All government departments were 
unfamiliar with concept of PPP.
-New form of project organizing 
required different contractual and 
administrative measures that Saudi 
bureaucracy did not have capacity to 
administer.
-Government departments could not 
make decisions that were not aligned 
with existing legal and regulatory 
frameworks.
-Handing airport to private operator 
that would decide “rules of the game” 
led to frustration among government 
entities.
-Familiarity with PPP concept and 
implementation process.
-Capacity to administer legal and 
regulatory requirements for 
drafting PPP contract.
-Handover of project to private 
sector.
-Understanding of requirements of 
successful partnership with 
private sector.
Sensegiving: 
-Explaining importance of project for Muslims 
all over the world, and for local economy.
-Explaining that only this project would be 
implemented as PPP, and no changes were 
required for entire project implementation 
process.
-Making public sector entities part of project 
implementation process.
Capacity building: 
-Helping government entities to administer PPP 





-Transforming airport from public 
entity into private operator meant 
government employees had to resign as 
government employees and transfer as 
private employees. 
-Drastic changes in administration 
and operation of airport caused fear, 
confusion, loss, and resistance among 
employees who refused to join new 
operator.
-Change of organizational 
identity and culture from public 
to private.
-Signing of new contract and 
abidance by new rules and 
regulations working for private 
sector company.
-Saudi employees having to work 
under project company owned by 
foreign businesses and ‘bosses’
-New sets of technical and 
administrative skills and higher 
Identity work: 
-Adjusting government employees’ 
organizational identity from public to private.
Sensegiving: 
Explaining to employees benefits of change for 
individual employees’ careers and country. 
-Explaining importance of PPP model for 
increasing number of Muslims performing 
pilgrimages and for economy.
Persuasion: 
-Increasing salaries and introducing new 
benefits for employees agreeing to shift to 
private employer.





























































Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
expectations of performance, 
discipline, and attendance.
-Loss of job security and working 
under three-year renewable 
contracts.
-Longer working hours and fewer 
holidays.
-Salary increases and promotions 
following strict measures that 
upset all employees.
-Reminding employees of religious 
gratification resulting from serving pilgrims 
going to holy mosques of Mecca and Medina.
Capacity building:
-Providing training to employees on new 
organizational practices and equipment. 
Dismissing redundant employees:
-Laying off unproductive employees 
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Figure 2: Process model displaying institutional work and power dynamics involved in PPP project 
implementation
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